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FOREST CHARGES AND TRUSTS:
SHARED BENEFITS WITH CLEAR RESPONSIBILITIES
William F, Hyde, Bruce R. Harker, Marcelino V. Dalrnacio,
and Ernesto S. Guiang 1
Foresters have a dilemma. Forests are extensive resources with
dispersed pockets of high commercial value and other pockets of
great environmental risk. Protecting these resources is difficult
because it is difficult to exclude unauthorized users from the forest--
and most forests are subject to illegal logging and other incidents of
forest trespass. The public holds foresters responsible for both the
high-value sites and the extensive regions of occasional trespass. The
foresters' dilemma is compounded by the contrast between national
and local values for the forest. National concerns with deforestation,
biodiversity and the unique characteristics of the natural environment
compete with the local importance of forests as sources of land for
the agricultural development of expanding upland populations.
This dilemma causes many foresters to be sympathetic with the
idea of community-based forest operations--but with strict controls
on the community operations and careful collection of the
government fees for wood resources. It seems to describe the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources' (DENR)
justification for its Community-Based Forest Management Program
(CBFM) and it seems to underlie DENR's evolving position on Industrial
Forest Management Agreements (IFMA). CBFM places forest land
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under local community management. IFMA takes land from canceled
Timber Licensing Agreements (TLAs) and encourages its sustainable
management by commercial timber enterprises. Both intend tO'ease
the government's administrative responsibilities and increase private
initiative while maintaining DENR oversight in order to protect the
environment and recover public revenues.
The objective of this paper is to examine CBFM and IFMA'within
the context of efficient forest management. We will look for ways to
accomplish agency, community, and commercial forestry objectives
while decreasing costs for each of these institutions. The key is to
focus DENR effort on the resource it manages--land and forests, not
logs--and on the specialized cases across the forest landscape that
pose significant environmental risks or promise large revenues for the
government treasury, while reducing DENR's management costs in
the more general and lower-value cases where 'either local
communities or a commercial enterprise can do a better job. We also
think that DENR should maintain a vigilant eye on the environment for
Iong-telm forestry investments c/,reated by the government
management of the macroeconomy, as Well as by DENR's own policies.
We will beg/,!n by reviewing the underlying principles of forest
development and by identifying the potential for sustainable
management and the collection, of forest revenues. We will also
consider_,,the development and administrative costs required to protect
the environment and those revenues. We will see that transferring
property rights frdm DENR to local communities or private managers
will not guarantee sustainable management and that plantation
forests are not always a viable substitute for resources extracted
from natural forests. That is, local communities and local private
management can improve the conditions for sustainable land
management and even for forest plantations--but they will never be
economically efficient to manage all forests sustainably.
The latter part of our paper will examine CBFM and IFMA within
the context of these principles. Community management and private
forest enterprise have much to recommend, but current DENR
oversight interferes with both. Our main conclusion is that redirecting
DENR's financial and human resources to focus on critical
environmental tasks and on those higher-value timber opportunities
Which foresters are better trained to manage will improve local
economies, increase the potential for sustainable management, and
increase the net collection of government revenues.HYDE et ah FOREST,CHARGESAND TRUSTS 225
PRINCIPLES OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
The most general principles of forest development are contained
in a simple diagram of the agricultural and forest landscape. Consider
agricultural land first. The value of agricultural land is a function of the
net farmgate price of agricultural products--which is greatest near
the local market at point A in Figure 1. Land value declines with
increasing distance to the market as described by the horizontal axis.
The function cr represents the cost of establishing and maintaining
secure rights to this land. This function increases as public
infrastructure and effective control decline with distance from the
market. The cost of obtaining legal title may remain constant with
distance but the cost of excluding trespassers increases dramatically
until no number of forest guards can fully exclude illegal loggers and
other local users of the forest in remote areas.
The functions explaining agricultural land value and the cost of
secure property rights intersect at point B. Farmers will manage land
between A and B for sustainable agricultural activities. They will use
land between points B and C (where agricultural value declines to
zero) as an open access resource to be exploited for short-term
advantage. They will harvest native crops that grow naturally in this
region, crops like fodder for their animals, native fruits, and fugitive
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resources like wildlife, but they will not invest even in modest
improvements in the region between B and C because the costs of
protecting investments in this region are greater than the investments
are worth. Their use of this open access region is unsustainable.
The mature natural forest at the frontier of agricultural
development at B has an initial negative value because it gets in the
way of agricultural production and its removal is costly. When the
forest begins to take on positive value, it must be worth less than
agricultural land and the function describing forest value must
intersect the horizontal axis in Figure 1 at some distance beyond point
B. Market demand justifies the removal of forest products at this
point, and it continues to justify their removal until the forest frontier
eventually shifts out to some point like,D. At this point the market
price of forest products just equals the cost of their removal and
delivery to the market. The in situ price (the stumpage'value for
timber, for example) is zero, and the value of forest land at D is also
zero. The region of unsustainable open access activities now extends
from point B out to point D. The costs of obtaining and protecting
property rights insure that this region will remain an open access
resource. Some trees will re-grow naturally in this degraded region
and the region's natural resources will be exploited in periodic "pulse"
harvests as soon as they grow to their minimum commercial value.
The region beyond point D remains an uneconomic and unexploited
natural forest residual because the costs of exploitation exceed the
value of products removed.
This story conforms with the common description of any initial
settlement, including modern settlement by migrants to the Philippine
uplands. It also conforms with the pattern of land use in stable upland
settlements, and it conforms with our image of commercial logging in
the Philippines for the last forty years. We described the pattern of
initial settlement. Consider the other two cases of stable upland
communities and commercial logging.
Farmers in stable upland communities make long-term
Conservation investments in agricultural technologies like terraces on
land where their property rights are secure, and sometimes they walk
long distances to the natural forest for products like fruit and rattan.
Some use the open access areas between their agricultural plots and
the forest to graze their livestock, a traditional pulse activity, and
many continue to collect fuelwood from the degraded open access
areas as soon as the scattered woody matter grows to a burnable size.HYDE et ah FORESTCHARGESAND TRUSTS 227
The forest first slows the rate of agricultural development but
later, as timber becomes a valuable commodity, loggers begin to clear
an area beyond the agricultural settlement. As timber becomes
increasingly valuable, loggers clear areas ever-farther from their prime
markets. They "cut and run" and leave a "no-man's land" of degraded
forest behind them. They always harvest to the point where the full
resource value is dissipated in harvest and access costs because, if
they left "value on the stump," another logger would take it.
Closer examination of the cost of secure property rights points to
another important case. The cost of protecting these rights is greater
for absentee landowners than for local landowners. This suggests an
absentee landowner cost function like c ' in Figure 1 where land to the r
right of point B' is effectively open access despite its legal registration
to an absentee owner. Transferring land in the region between points
B' and B to lower-cost local owners would encourage its sustainable
management. Of course, DENR is an absentee landowner, and this
explanation is the rationale for transferring some DENR properties to
upland settlers or to lower-cost community forestry operations. 2
Consumers in our landscape in Figure 1 must go beyond point D if
they continue to demand the products of forest resources. Access
costs for forest products (and the product prices) must continue to
rise until some later time t 2 when the higher market price equals the
cost of tree crop substitutes for forests (including the cost of local
property rights Cr). When this price also exceeds the opportunity cost
for agricultural land, then trees will begin to compete as successful
crops (either plantation forests or agroforestry) somewhere to the left
of point B (or point B' for the properties of absentee landowners).
Consumers will continue to remove some products from the new
frontier of mature natural forest at E. Subsequent to t 2, plantation
forests to the left of B and pulse harvests from the region between
points B and E will satisfy all demands for forest products. No further
extraction will occur from the natural forest beyond point E because
the access costs associated with ventures into the natural forest
exceed the market price.
2. Tomichet al.(1995, chs.4,5)explain thatthecostsof protecting a unitofproperty
increase withthesizeofthe property--as wellas withdistance.DENRmanages the
largest unitoflandinthePhilippines. Therefore, itscostsforprotecting theproperty are
probably greater perhectarethanthecostsofanyotherlandowner inthecountry,This
isa related, butadditional, reason totransfer someDENR properties toupland settlersor
to lower-cost community forestry operations.228 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
This story is well documented with rigorous economic analyses,
and with examples from many cultures and developmental
experiences. 3 There are many examples of subsistence farmers who
plant trees in agroforestry operations or small plantations, but there
are many other examples in other parts of the Philippines where the
prices of forest products are not yet sufficient to induce this
smallholder activity. This means that some local markets (perhaps like
those in most of Palawan) fit the description of our Figure 1 landscape
at t 1 with a natural forest frontier at D, while others (perhaps much of
Bohol and Cebu, for example) fit the description at t 2 with a natural
forest frontier at E and some tree crops to the left of point 13. The
industrial plantations of PICOP or the other industrial plantations near
Butuan City, for example, are evidence that prices in the world
markets for commercial forest products are a sufficient private
incentive to support our t 2 characterization of them.
MODIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES
Our diagrammatic presentation is simplified because it shows an
unchanging agricultural demand and a single price for forest products,
and because it overlooks stock effects. Growing upland populations
and increasing food demands would push the agricultural land value
3, Forexample, H_fstad (1997) describesrisingcharcoalprices and ever more-distant
wood removal in the regionsurroundingDares Salaam, Tanzania; Chomitz and Gray
(1994) describe a similar pattern for roads, agriculture, and deforestationin Betize;and
Krutillaet el, (1995) providea moregeneralexamplefor deforestationaround33 urban
centers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Alston et el. (1996) describe the
relationshipsbetween settlement, property rights, and risingprices on the frontier of
Brazil'sAmazon, Both Johnsonand Libeoap (1980) and Berck(1979) show that 19th
centuryUS loggingneverextendedintothefrontierat morethan afinanciallyoptimalrate.
Severalrecent analysesdescribesituations where priceshave risen sufficiently to
induceinvestmentsinsustainableforestry. SeeHydeandSave (1993) for Malawi where
subsistencehouseholdplantingsmay overcome a 3.5 percent rate of forest depletion
within ten years;Scherr(1995) and Patti et el. (1995) for western Kenyawhich shifted
from ninetypercent dependentonnaturalforestsfor constructionwood inthe 1950s to
eightypercent dependenton forest plantations today; or Amacher et el. (1993b) and
Singh(1994) for similarstories for Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Provinceand India's
Punjab,respectively. Amacher et el. (1992, 1993a) examinetwo districtsin Nepaland
describethe production, price, and consumption differences that cnuse subsistence
farmers to plant trees and adopt wood-savingtechnologtesin one district but not the
other. Viennaetal. (1995) show that, once the market price rose high enough, even
Brazil nuts, for many the forest product that has been least responsiveto scientific
intervention,have beendomesticated incommercialplantations_HYDE et el: FOREST CHARGES AND TRUSTS 229
function to the right over time. This would shift points B and C to the
right. Additional forest products, each with their own prices and
forest value functions, would have their own points D and E--and local
inhabitants would go different distances into the standing natural forest
to extract different products. The general diagrammatic character-
ization of the problem, however, remains the same in any case.
Stock effects measure the forest's value as a standing resource.
If we anticipate that either biological growth or changes in forest
product prices will increase the value of standing timber over time,
then current market prices will underestimate the true long-run value
of the forest. The forest frontier at either D or E set by current market
value will be too far to the right and the current level of logging is
excessive. This problem should not concern us too much because the
natural forests at the frontier of economic activity are mature. Their
growth rates are insignificant. Moreover, virtually all world natural
resource prices for which we have extensive records have declined (in
inflation-free real terms) over the last 200 years. 4 World prices for
tropical hardwood logs are probably holding steady, and they may
eventually decline as well. Therefore, the stock effects are probably
small and they may be negative. Negative stock effects (due to
decreasing real prices) would redouble the incentive for loggers to
harvest as far as they can today because the values they pursue may
be lower tomorrow.
FUNDAMENTAL CONCLUSIONS
The fundamental conclusions from this analysis should be clear:
1) An expanding region of deforestation causes delivered forest
product prices to rise (but not in situ prices); rising prices eventually
4. Stumpage pricerecordsare problematic. Barnettand Morse's (1963) classicstudy
of long-term price trends for primary resources found that US lumber prices were
increasing,but pulpwoodpriceswere not. Theydid notfindacceptablestumpage price
records, Sedjo and Lyon (1990) observedthat any long-termtrend for US stumpage
pricesto increasehasprobably run its course. Stumpage pricetrends are problematic
because (barringpolicy constraintsthat create rents) the value of timber from natural
forests is entirely consumed by harvest and access costs. Timber from plantation
forests,however, willhave • positivestumpagevalue. Therefore,the averagestumpege
price for any regionwill range upward from zero dependingon the importanceof rent
creating policyconstraintsend the share of all harveststhat originatefrom commercial
plantations. These points shouldbecome clearer in the discussionof forest rent that
follows.230 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
induce investments in agroforestry and commercial forest plantations
and bring an end to deforestation and exploitation of the remaining
natural forest. This insight provides a ray of hope for global concerns
on tropical deforestation and for our own desire to protect some of
the Philippines' residual forest of native trees. 2) There is an important
and extensive region in which open access and unsustainable
management is efficient because the costs of defending property
rights in this region exceed the fundamental values at risk.
Environmental and other non-market forest values that originate in
this region will require the specific attention of DENR managers.
People will use the land between points B or B' and D or E, but
they will treat it as an open access resource. They will not manage it
sustainably because sustainability implies long-term decision making
and protecting the land for future uses, but the costs of protection
exceed the values at risk. Legal or administrative action can shift
some responsibility from DENR to the local community or local land
manager (thereby shifting the cost function from c ' to c and shifting r r
point B' toward point 13)but neither legal nor administrative action
alone can change the condition of unsustainable land use. Some land
will remain between points B or B' and D or E and no private investor
will manage this land sustainably.
Moreover, at the frontier of natural forests, government
regulation in any form is expensive (the difference between the
horizontal axis at D or E and c ' in Figure 1) and it protects a resource r
that has no in situ value. This means that pure economic rents seldom
exist because some alert entrepreneur would have harvested to the
frontier at point D or E, and extracted the rents in a previous period.
The entrepreneur would have been there legally if there were no
government restrictions. If legal or administrative restrictions did
exist, but the enforcing agency could not afford the full costs of
complete enforcement implied by cr', then some entrepreneur would
have found a way to be there illegally. Clearly, this shows us that it is
easier to write policy than to enforce it, and that the gains from
enforcing many forest policies do not justify their costs.
Our two fundamental conclusions are valid for commercial timber.
They are also valid for most other forest resource values because
most forest values are represented in local agricultural markets even
where the predominant economy is subsistence-based. They are true
in the greater reaches of Manila in, for example, the forested areas of
the province of Laguna, and they are true in the sitios of SouthHYDE etal: FORESTCHARGESAND TRUSTS 231
Cotabato. The only difference will be that forest product prices have
risen to the level that justifies tree crops in some regions but will not
have risen to this level in others.
The critical implications for public policy are:
• to simplify the pursuit of forest charges for the
government treasury;
• to examine the policy environment for ways to shift the
property right functions in Figure 1 and the patterns of
land use in ways that will improve the incentives for long-
term sustainable management and satisfy social and
environ-mental objectives.
This is the challenge--and it should be the guiding principle of
policy change. It is the spirit of CBFM, and perhaps IFMA, but it
deserves amplification in order to demonstrate the reasonable policy
outcomes.
CBFM is designed for the many cases of smaller and local forest
values where DENR has tried but been unable to enforce its preferred
activities. Local operators with site-specific knowledge and lower
enforcement costs will do better in some locations. Furthermore, the
shift from DENR to local responsibility will ensure an increase in the
sustainable land use base comparable to region B'-B in Figure 1. This
is a desirable result. Whether or not the local forest product price
induces tree planting and long-term forest management is a local
empirical question. Some of the increase in long-term management
will convert previously degraded forests to agricultural uses. Others
may become tree crops. Both are sustainable. Therefore, both are
environmental improvements. However, open access and unsustain-
able forest exploitation will occur under any scenario. DENR and the
general public must accept this.
The larger industrial operations that produce higher-value forest
products for the broader economy are a related case that will benefit
from the closer examination of forest rent in the next section of our
paper. It should be clear that DENR's reasonable objective for these
operations can be explained as reducing its oversight costs (from cr'
toward cr in Figure 1) while still ensuring good environmental
performance. Once more, this action will ensure an increase in the
sustainable land use base comparable to region B'-B in Figure 1, but
whether the local forest product price is sufficient to induce
plantation management is an empirical question that will vary from232 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
location to location and from one commercial operation to the next.
Legal requirements for reforestation will not make it happen. The
recent experience of unsuccessful reforestation subsidies for Timber
License Agreement is clear evidence of this point. Once more, some
unsustainable open access forest exploitation will occur under any
scenario.
This unsettling conclusion is best addressed by reminding
ourselves of the reason we object to it. We object because, in some
important cases, it degrades the environment, which in turn affects
future uses of this land and its resources, as well as of adjacent lands.
In forest environments, the major forms of environmental degradation
are soil erosion (steep slopes, stream banks, and critical watersheds)
and loss of biodiversity (old growth and rare and endangered species).
Fortunately, soils do not erode and biodiversity is not lost in every
location where someone extracts forest resources. Fortunately too,
foresters are trained ecologists whose basic instincts are to respect
these environmental aspects of the forest. Therefore, the solution is
to identify the critical areas for protection against erosion and loss of
biodiversity before the unsustainable extraction activity begins, to
remove these areas from the land base eligible for extractive
activities, and to direct a renewed DENR forestry focus on protecting
these critical areas. Neither DENR nor any other forest ministry has
the financial resources or the personnel to worry about all areas. It
must concentrate its limited resources on the critical areas that
demand greatest attention. This solution simplifies things by
focusing directly on the key objective of environmental protection.
It will be a major component of our recommendations for CBFM
and IFMA.
FOREST RENT REVISITED
It may be instructive to take a closer look at forest rent, and also
at the impact of uncertain policy expectations. An understanding of
the potential for rent will be important for assessing reasonable
charges for industrial forest operations, and perhaps for some
community-based operations. An understanding of the destructive
effect that uncertain policy environments have on long-term capital
investments will be important in assessing reasonable expectations
for sustainable industrial forestry operations.HYDE et al: FORESTCHARGESAND TRUSTS 233
Our earlier claim that rents are uncommon begs questions about
why loggers continue cutting trees, why their profits may seem
excessive, and under what circumstances significant rents do arise.
Loggers continue cutting because there is sufficient opportunity at
the margin to obtain a fair return on capital investments in logging
equipment. Excess profits are unlikely, however, as long as there are
no barriers to restrict entry to the logging business. New entrants will
compete and bid away the excess.
Purchasing the logging equipment, building a road to the site, and
delivering the equipment to that site is expensive. It requires a large
capital investment (even when the logging itself is done with
chainsaws and carabao). Road costs alone generally exceed the value
of a single block of timber, and loggers only recover these road costs
by harvesting several blocks of timber off the same road. What may
seem like a large absolute value for the timber taken from a logging
contract often barely reimburses the capital expenditures and leaves
very little for a fair return on the capital investment. We know this
because the logging business is like the small retail sector or the
restaurant business. There are many small entrepreneurs and many
failures for every large and lasting success.
Indeed, logging operators in the Philippines are too numerous and
often too small to show up in government records, and even the
sawmill sector has a large component of small entrepreneurs who
experience only temporary. For example, sixteen percent of national
sawmill capacity in 1994 was classified as mini-sawmills and more
than one-half of these were inactive (DENR nd).
Sources of Forest Rent
Nevertheless, examples of large rents probably do exist, and we
can imagine the potential for excessive profits where some
exogenous action creates a sharp and rapid, even sudden, shift in the
forest land value function at points D or E in Figure 1. Figure 2
magnifies the relevant section of Figure 1 in order to focus on such
shifts. The exogenous action creates an increase in the forest land
value between two periods, such that the frontier of natural forest
can shift from some previous point E' to point E in Figure 2 and create
rents or excess profits equal to the darker-shaded area. This action
must be rapid or private investors would anticipate it, invest
accordingly, and extract the rents as they gradually rise in small234 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
increments. We can imagine two general actions that fit this
description: increased rural infrastructure (roads in particular) and
effective timber harvest constraints.
Roads are the best example of improved infrastructure affecting
forestry. Building a new road into the interior rapidly makes the
previously inaccessible forest more accessible to the market. It shifts
the intersection of the forest land value gradient from E' to E and
creates a rent equal to the darker area in Figure 2. We often overlook
that this rent is a return to roadbuilding, and the authority arranging
for the road may have a claim on its collection.
The second potential source of forest rents is an effective forest
policy constraint, most commonly administrative procedure that
slows the approval rate for acceptable harvest concessions, or a
policy that restricts concessions from select areas or restricts annual
harvest levels within a concession. Either the administrative
procedure or the policy constrains harvests while prices rise (or
access costs decrease) over time and the land value gradient moves
out to point E in Figure 2. Once more, a forest rent equal to the darker
area arises.
Figure2. Forest Rent
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The agency responsible for the constraint (or the road) created the
rent, but the existence of this rent raises several questions: Why did
the constraint exist in the first place and why does the agency want
to relax it and allow logging now? What has changed? If relaxation of
the constraint is an appropriate action now, then why was it not
appropriate at some earlier time? Are there other forested areas in the
country where the policy still constrains harvests? Should the agency
relax the constraint in these areas as well? (We could ask similar
questions about roads into other new areas.) These are important
questions because the constraint forces the economy to forego a real
financial gain equal to the rents from all such areas. Any government
should be very clear as to why it would make such a decision.
This point is doubly true because effective enforcement of the
constraint is probably very costly. We can see this by recalling that
the costs cr of protecting the rights to the forest property exceed the
value of forest land at the frontier. On the other hand, fully effective
enforcement is seldom possible as the government probably could not
afford the costs necessary to exclude all trespassers from the
forested region between E' and E in Figure 2. An unprotected rent is
an incentive for illegal logging, and a history of illegal logging indicates
that the remaining forest and the remaining rent in Figure 2 (the
darker shaded area) would be smaller than anticipated.
The Philippines has two excellent examples of policy constraints
that create rents. The first is any adjustment in the annual allowable
cut (AAC) that actually leads to an increase in timber harvests.
Adjustments in the AAC are government policy and where the
previous AAC was a significant constraint, and if illegal logging did
not deplete the resource, then a rent built up. It awaits collection
whenever DENR makes the policy decision to increase the AAC. The
second example of rent creation is the case of Lianga Bay. The rents
in this case were created by a militant local population (rather than
central government authority) who still prevent access to the
resource by outsiders. Regardless of our political judgment of the local
action, it created a rent that awaits collection once loggers are
allowed renewed access to the resource. 5
5. The Philippine log exportbanis athird example.An effectivelog exportbanwould
causea renttobuildup-just asaneffective,AACdoes. Wegenerally observe thatlog
¢×portbansaredifficulttoenforcec'is high) ageloggingtendsto occur,therents [ *
dissipate, and log bans are not especmlly effsctive,236 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Collecting Forest Rents
Finally, if some effective action created a rent--for whatever
reason and at whatever cost--then the next question is what would
be the best way to collect that rent. Foresters generally collect rents
as product prices, usually stumpage fees or log charges. Figure 3
provides a variation on the depiction of forest rent that allows us to
focus on log charges. The vertical axis is value per log (rather than
value per land unit) and the horizontal axis continues to measure
distance or decreasing access--as in Figures 1 and 2. The delivered
price of forest products is pf (for example; the price of logs at the mill
or at the port) and c is the cost of harvesting and •delivering the logs. X
The harvest and delivery cost increases with distance or decreasing
accessibility. Rent, equivalent to the darker-shaded area between E'
and E in Figure 2, is the full area between pf and cx, It is the total
stumpage value for all standing timber between points E' and E in
either Figure 2 or Figure 3.
Identifying the maximum stumpage value for each log or each
increment of standing timber is a practical impossibility. Therefore,
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many forest ministries rely on a uniform fee per delivered log. (In the
Philippines, DENR distinguishes between species groups but the fee
remains uniform with respect to the location of log removal or the
difficulty of extracting and delivering it.) In Figure 3, this is equivalent
to collecting Pf-Pl per log out to point E". It should be clear that, in this
case, the rent collected by the government is less than the full rent
available. Furthermore, uniform fee structures like this restrict
profitable logging to the region between E' and E" and leaves an
incentive (profits equal to the triangle abe in Figure 3) to illegally log
the region between E" and E.6
A long tradition explains forestry's general reliance on auctions of
stumpage or logs, but the tradition does not fit the modern Philippine
forestry situation. The German and French foresters who, 100-150
years ago were the forebears of modern forestry, managed the forest
did the logging, and sold the logs themselves. They needed an
inventory of standing timber in order to plan their long-term harvest
operations, and they scaled the logs they harvested in order to
discriminate by grade in their log sales.
British and North American foresters learned their forestry
technique from these Europeans, and then taught others, including
the early faculty at the University of the Philippines College of
Forestry at Los BaSos. No one seems to have re-examined the local
context. The European procedures are only partially applicable in
North America where public agency foresters often manage the forest
but never do the logging. These procedures are not applicable at all in
the Philippines and many other places where public agency foresters
assign the use of a timber concession (an aiea of forest land, not a
log), and a private operator manages the concession and the logging
activity.
Any operation in any enterprise succeeds best by focusing on the
market for its own product. The European foresters did their best by
preparing for and establishing log markets. Philippine foresters would
do their best by preparing for and establishing markets for the rights
to use land and forests. This means that lump sum auctions for use
6. The maximumstumpagefee Pf'Po will not maximizerent collectionbecauseit
minimizesthe numberof logs. Themaximumrent collectionfrom a uniform fee is a
mathematicalfunction of cx (or a function of the elasticityof extractionand delivery
costs). This maximumis an empiricalquestionthat varieswith eachloggingsite and
eachtimberconcession.Clearly,abroadregional ornationallogging feedoesnotsatisfy
anyobvious objective,imposes significant collection costs,andinvitesitlegal logging.2_38 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
rights to the specified forest areas would be an improved alternative
to log fees--so long as entry to the auction is open, additional bidders
are welcome, and the size of the sale is not so large as to limit
competition.
Lump sum auctions for the rights to usi_ a specific forest area
decrease both government costs and the' costs Of the private logger,
and they insure that the government collects the maximum forest
rent. They decrease government costs by removing the need for
government forest inventories, log scalers, and collectors of log fees.
They also cut the need for the government authorities to monitor the
movement of log trucks. In sum, the administrative task of collecting
one single lump sum fee is much simpler than the task of collecting
many individual log fees. Removing government scaling and
monitoring activities also eliminates the incentive for loggers to mask
the origin or logs from public lands and frees the flows of log trucks.
For some loggers, this would save enough log delivery time to allow
them to make two loads per day rather than one. This difference
decreases costs for the logger, increases the return on the loggers"
investments in trucks by as much as 100 percent, and enables
loggers to increase their lump sum bid prices. Higher bid prices means
even greater government rent collection.
In terms of Figure 3, private bidders would not bid on land or
forests beyond point E because their own costs exceed their potential
gains. They might bid up to the full rent for the region from E' to E, but
each bidder's judgment of this rent and his/her best bid would depend
on the bidder's own costs c× and the price pf that the bidder can
obtain for delivered logs. Bidders would rely on appraisals conducted
in their own interests. Government timber appraisals are expensive,
and they are unnecessary in regions with multiple logging firms and
free entry to the auction. The government only needs to mark the sale
boundaries, host the auction, and monitor its environmental harvest
standards. 7
Environmental harvest standards and environmental monitoring
were unnecessary for the old European foresters because they
7. The governmentcost savings are not trivial. In the United Statesthe costs of
government timbersalesexceedtimbersalereceiptson 62 of 156 nationalforests.
Boado (1988) claimsthatDENR timberoperations, likegovernment timberoperations in
the US, costmorethanthey returnto the Philippine treasury. Surely, the expensive
costsofconducting timberinventories andappraisals, oflogscalingandstumpagefee
collection andenforcement arepartoftheproblem, Allof thesecostsareunnecessary
with lumpsumauctions,ratherthansalesof logsor unitsof stumpage.HVDF_ el' ,_/:FOREST CHARGE5 AN[3 TI]U_iT{i 290
managed the environment themselves. Environmental standards are
necessary in the Philippines because the concessionaire wins only a
restricted right to land that will eventually revert to the government.
DENR and the Philippine public have a continuing interest in the long-
term condition of property that it only leases to concession operators.
We will discuss environmental standards in more detail in our
recommendations for CBFM and IFMA.
Auctions should be designed to attract multiple bids, and auctions
of large tracts which only attract single bids should be divided and
rebid with the objective of receiving more bids. Single bid auctions on
small sales will be relatively unimportant because they can only occur
in locations where the values at stake are so low as to fail to entice
competition. Moreover, a small number of bidders for any local timber
sale means that only local actors have the situational knowledge
necessary to extract gain from it. In this case, the rent may really be
a return on the bidder's local knowledge. Taxing it away would be a
disincentive for local entrepreneurial activity. Furthermore, the
government's administrative costs for obtaining greater rents on
small single bid auctions would probably exceed the value of rents
collected.
Altogether, these insights instruct us to rely on lump sum
auctions for land use, not auctions of logs or stumpage, and to focus
on locations where the auctions will entice multiple bidders and large
bids--but to minimize government costs and to rely on the
advantages of local operations in the many small and general cases of
few bids and low bid values.• In the Philippines, IFMA fits the former
case and CBFM fits the latter.
A STABLE POLICY ENVIRONMENT
As foresters we often overlook the importance of a stable
economic and political environment. Stability means predictable and
consistent expectations about change. (It does not mean "no
change.") Unstable macroeconomic and policy environments destroy
the incentives for long-term investments in activities like sustainable
forestry, and encourage practices like "cut and get out" logging
behavior. These can be real problems in this day of ever-increasing
environmental demands and changing responses of forestry agencies
to these demands.240 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Both forest plantations and the heavy equipment necessary for
large scale logging are long-term investments, in the presence of
macroeconomic instability and policy uncertainty, firms would
underinvest in plantations and logging equipment because they
cannot be sure of obtaining the full return on their investments before
the economic or policy environment turns to their disadvantage.
Conversely, improving macroeconomic conditions and an increasingly
reliable policy environment would induce capital investment. Capital
investment in forests would be a step toward sustainability. Capital
investment in better equipment would allow logging firms more
efficient use of all inputs, including the land and trees. This may mean
that loggers would harvest farther into the frontier, and it would
certainly mean that they will utilize the forest they already harvest
more completely. Improved utilization (more lumber recovery per log,
greater use of low-valued species, more recovery per acre, and less
residual scrap wood left on the forest floor after harvest) is a frequent
environmental policy objective. A stable macro-economic and forest
policy environment will help achieve it.
A stable macroeconomic and policy environment is an evolving
condition. It takes time to build and, therefore, is unlikely to create
excess profits. A sudden deterioration of this environment, however,
can destroy long-term capital investments, decrease forest
investments, and disrupt long-run forest management. Deacon (1994,
1995) showed that this is a critical source of world deforestation,
accounting for up to twenty percent of the variation in deforestation
across countries.
In terms of Figure 1, an unstable policy environment means that
the forestry enterprise does not have confident expectations about
i
whether government rules defining cr will either relax or become
more confining. Similarly, the enterprise does not know whether
government scaling and log market requirements will relax or tighten.
It may not know whether periodic community or DENR review of its
management plans would force a shift in some strategic activity.
Finally, it does not know when DENR might enforce its rules on illegal
logging and void the enterprise's contract--regardless of who actually
did the illegal logging. In this unstable policy environment, the firm
would probably do best to protect itself against the less favorable
possibilities. This means it would act as if cr will be higher and prices
will be lower. The first shifts point B' to the left and expands the area
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and B. The second decreases forest land value, thereby delaying the
time when sustainable forest investments become financially justifiable.
In terms of Figure 3, for areas where significant forest rents do
exist, an unstable policy environment causes loggers to act as if pf
may fall and c× may rise. This means the efficient harvest level would
decline. It induces loggers to harvest toward E as rapidly as they
can--before policies change. Thus, an unstable policy environment
delays or decreases sustainable forest practices like plantations,
increases the area of unsustainable open access exploitation for
whatever land use activity, and encourages rapid harvest behavior
and lower levels of forest utilization in logging concessions. All are
undesirable from the perspectives of both economic development and
the environment.
An unstable policy environment is a serious issue, and one that
probably has significant implications for Philippine forestry today. We
can see this by making two comparisons, one with forestry in
Indonesia and one with investment s in the general Philippine
economy. Forest concessions in Indonesia endure and concession-
aires do invest in plantations in some places. Neither seems to be true
in any substantial sense in the Philippines. Indonesia may provide
concessionaires more favorable treatment, and the Philippines may or
may not think that favoritism is justified. That is not the point.
Indonesia clearly provides more reliable forest policy expectations.
Reliability is a necessary ingredient for long-term investments, and it
explains the different levels of forestry success between Indonesia
and the Philippines.
The overall Philippine economy in recent years also demonstrates
the importance of policy stability for forestry. The EDSA revolution
improved the political environment but it left investors cautious. They
were encouraged, but they watched and waited while they confirmed
their favorable expectations. The economy stuttered through a period
without much capital inflow. With time, confidence did build because
government macroeconomic policy and especially policy toward
capital investment remained steady. In time we began to see capital
inflows and long-term investment--in private construction, in
consumption of consumer durables, and in public infrastructure. The
level of capital investment in the last six or seven years has been
phenomenal.
Logging equipment and plantations are long-term investments--
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construction we see in Manila or Davao City today. So why is forestry
an exception to the recent general Philippine success with long-term
capital? One reason is that the forest policy environment places
forestry investors in a very uncertain operating environment.
Investors face an almost perpetual review and re-approval process,
with serious likelihood of effective challenge to reasonable behavior,
as well as numerous impossible standards which could be used at any
time to void their contracts with DENR.8 DENR must find a way to
satisfy an environmentally conscious public while improving
investment policy expectations if it wishes to encourage serious long-
term private forest management. And it must persevere in this
objective because, as we saw following the EDSA revolution, investor
confidence does not build overnight.
The positive side of this message is that the Philippines competes
in a world of unreliable suppliers for tropical hardwoods and tropical
hardwood products. That is, many of the other producer countries
also suffer uncertain macroeconomic and policy environments.
Improving the DENR policy environment should give the Philippines a
comparative advantage over these competitors, transferring some
long-term forestry investments from those countries to the
_Philippines, and further improving the prospects for sustainable
plantation management and increasing government forestry revenues
in the Philippines.
TWO APPLICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES
Opportunities for Successful Community-Based
and Industrial Forest Management
More than 200 Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) covered 2/3
of the forested area of the Philippines in 1976. Some have lapsed and
some have been withdrawn. In their place 2.5 to 3.0 million hectares
of forest remain, and the deforestation and unsustainable practices
that caused all but 28 TLAs to lapse or be withdrawn go on despite
8. For example,renewalsof TLAswerealwaysindoubt,andthe required procedures
for allottinglFMAshavealreadybeenchangedthreetimes. Extensive andregularNGO,
localgovernment,andDENR reviewwritten intocurrentCBFMandIFMApolicyextends
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the discontinuance of the timber concessions. Of course, an upland
population of 10 million is largely responsible, and a substantial flow
of migrants regularly increases this upland population and reinforces
local deforestation and unsustainable land use.
Centralized forest management is a daunting task, and it has been
largely unsuccessful. Something different must be tried. The generally
preferred solutions are local community management of the many
cases of generally lower-value forest resources and private sector
management of the smaller number of high-value plantations and
production forests. DENR seems to support both concepts. In the first
case, the c'ommunities with the greatest stake in the resource would
manage it for their own long-term interest--but with oversight from
DENR. In the second case, DENR divides private sector management
into two classes, but the general rule is to transfer land use to the
private firm offering the best guarantee of sustainable forestry, in all
cases, the community organization or the private firm agrees to pay a
fee to the government for its forest products, generally logs. The
question for our consideration is what would be the best way to
transfer responsibility from DENR to the local communities or the
private firm while insuring equitable distributions, sustainable
practices, and financial returns sufficient to repay foreign loans for
the forestry sector--while also improving the agency's public
credibility. This is no easy tasM
This final section of our paper recommends simple structures for
accomplishing this task, first with CBFM and then with IRMA, and it
concludes with a summary of new roles for DENR, including the
advantages of a stronger environmental presence. 9 As we consider
our recommendations, we must remember the principles we have just
reviewed. We must also recognize that the best program design is the
simplest--because more complex designs are more costly to
administer, because forests are generally low-value resources, and
because we know from experience that many of DENR's prior
management strictures were difficult to enforce. Furthermore, many
9. Readers with further interest in existing policy for CBFM might refer to Executive
Order 263 and DENRAdministrative Order 22-1993 which are the basic documents,
DENR memorandum 95-18 which sets u'p eleven pilot sites, and Community Forest
Management Agreement 13-001 with the SAMMILIA Forest Development Cooperative
(Lianga, Surigao del Sur). Readers with further interest in IFMA might refer to DENR
Administrative Order 60-1993 and the IFMA Implementation Manual. The field
experience of the NRMPstaff and other DENRcolleagues is also a useful resource.244 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
of the old forestry rules and procedures are poorly designed or even
unnecessary for DENR's objectives. They never did fit Philippine
forestry administration realities.
The greatest difficulty for the Department will be our
recommendations for changes in its own institution. (CBFM and
IFMA could be core programs for a wholly revised forestry
agency--with a new level of responsiveness to local resource-
based human populations and to the environment.) If the greatest
difficulty for DENR's foresters will be discarding old institutions,
then the greatest satisfaction should come from the opportunity to
renew their focus on serving the people and protecting the
environment. These are the reasons most of us became foresters
and they are the most basic elements of our training. It should be
gratifying to get back to them.
General Recommendation
Our first recommendation is to clearly distinguish between CBFM
and IFMA. These are parallel programs designed to address different
problems and to satisfy different objectives. Each has its own
independent and specific purpose.
CBFM is intended to assist local communities. It reflects an
underlying distributive objective of DENR and some of its critics.
Locally specific knowledge gives additional value to the areas of
CBFMs, and local use made prior DENR management of these areas
both difficult and expensive. Therefore, CBFM is best-designed for
generally lower-value areas which, nevertheless, are important to
local communities. Heavy-handed impositions of external manage-
ment criteria should be avoided in CBFM because they interfere with
the intention of local determination and remove the financial incentive
that local knowledge creates.
IFMA is best-designed for those larger and more valuable areas
where large-scale private operations can successfully invest and
obtain a commercial return on their investments. The land base for
successful IFMAs can be plantations, degraded forests, or residual
productive forests. The important characteristics, regardless of the
land base, are the opportunity for a fair return on private investments
of financial and material capital, some opportunity for the collection
of government fees, and reasonable opportunity for sustainable
management.HYDE et al: FORESTCHARGESAND TRUSTS 245
It is important not to confuse CBFM with larger-scale commercial
opportunity, nor to confuse larger-scale commercial opportunity and
government revenue recovery on IFMA lands with the very selective
equity objectives appropriate to local communities and CBFM.
Combining them--as %ocialized IFMA" or as large CBFMs containing
industrial forestry operations--only creates competing objectives and
competing purposes and assures confusion and uncertainty for any
private sector operation of whatever scale,
Recommendations for Community-Based Forest Management
The basic problem in establishing a CBFM agreement with a local
community or community organization is the selection of land use
boundaries and of the local group to assign the land use rights. The
first steps are to mark tentative boundaries and hold public meetings.
The public meetings should focus on two simple objectives: refining
DENR's preliminary identification of boundaries and identifying
interested individuals and local organizations with the capability to
manage a CBFM. DI=NRdoes not need to face the plethora of issues
that can arise in community debate. It does not want to be held
accountable at a later date for some prior and obscure discussion. It
should announce its intention to contain the discussion of these public
meetings within these two topics, and then it should manage these
meetings accordingly.
The second step is to draw final boundaries and to remove the
most environmentally sensitive areas from within those boundaries,
probably the steepest slopes, the stream ban,,ks,and any specific sites
which are sensitive to biodiversityobjectives. DENR remains the land
owner and, like any other land owner, it is desirous of receiving its
land in good condition at the end of the CBFM lease. DENR also has a
responsibility to ensure that the uses of its land neither damage long-
term social values like biodiversity nor damage adjacent lands and
their uses. The best way to insure these conditions may be to
withdraw those environmentally sensitive areas that are within the
C BFM boundaries and to maintain them as a direct DENR
responsibility. Direct DENR responsibility is probably better than the
alternative of private CBFM management with environmental
limitations and more indirect monitoring of private use by DENR.
Direct DENR responsibility for the environmentally sensitive areas is
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management insights, insights which are certain to change over the
lifetime of a 2B-year renewable lease. 1°
The current CBFM documents require a forest inventory of
standing timber volume, a formal management plan, and the
assistance of a qualified professional assisting organization (AO) to
help prepare them. These are unnecessary if DENR has ensured its
environmental responsibility. The inventory of standing timber may
not even refer to the non-timber resources that give the forest its
greatest value for the local community. These activities are beyond
local capability and comprehension, and the notion of an AO to advise
on them is a denial of the CBFM intention to rely on local judgment.
Furthermore, the inventory, the plan, and the AO are expensive. By
definition, CBFMs are areas of generally lower-value which may not
support these costs. They are also areas where DENR has had limited
prior success in enforcing rules like harvest levels that are based on a
timber inventory and a management plan. DENR's ability to enforce its
management criteria will not change with the development of a plan
or the contractual arrangements of a CBFM. DENR should eliminate
these requirements from its CBFM contracts.
The third step is to transfer the use rights for the land within the
final CBFM boundaries. Any local individual, collection of individuals,
or organization that can sign a legal contract and which has the
capability to manage a CBFM should be an eligible agent. DENR has no
reason to discriminate in favor of, for example, licensed cooperatives,
or any other specialized group. It has no reason to discriminate in
favor of particular land uses (such as timber production). If local
interest is weak, then DI=NRmight donate the entire parcel of land to
the community group or groups which it determines are most
responsible. If interest is strong and multiple local groups display an
interest, then DENR might either divide the CBFM among the groups--
or conduct an auction.
Subsequent to transferring the rights to land use, DENR's
continuing responsibility is to ensure a good climate for sustainable
land management. The most encouraging situation would be
described as "no continuing management oversight, no annual plan
10. SomeCBFM documents banmechanical logging, forexample,Thisbanconstrains
CBFM activities unnecessarily, anditconstrains theopportunity forfinancial gain,innon-
erosive areas. Furthermore, it will becomeleasneceaaary asthe worlddesigns bstt_r
logging equipment, it wouldbeunnecessary nowiftheerosive areassubject to damage
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preparations, no annual review with its own uncertainty and
potentially delayed outcomes, and no restrictions on the marketing of
forest products." Permission for land transfers from the successful
first recipient of a CBFM contract to new groups after the contract
has been awarded would ensure higher-value land uses and the
optimal scale of local operations, as well as the adjustments to each
of these features that must occur over the 25-year life of any
contract. The likelihood of sustainable land use activities would
increase as a result. DENR approval of any eventual transfers should
be a simple formality so long as the new manager can live up to the
terms of the original CBFM contract. If DENR's objective is
sustainable land use, then the only terms of the contract should be
environmental protection. DENR has a responsibility to monitor the
protected areas, and damage to the adjacent and withdrawn areas
previously identified as environmentally risky is the only grounds for
DENR voiding a contract.
In addition, DENR can assist its own objective of sustainable
management by providing extension-like forestry advice. If this advice
is provided with the intention of satisfying the land user's objectives,
not the forester's notion of "good forestry," then technical assistance
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will help build local goodwill and insure better protection of those
environmentally critical areas which DENR withholds for its own
management.
The basic CBFM documents require payment of log fees equal to
twenty percent of the gross receipts plus a Trust Fund composed of
an additional thirty percent of gross receipts from sales of forest
products. The Trust Fund would be used to reimburse DENR's costs
and the costs of an AO, and also to provide a source of revenue for
approved local investment. We believe that the Trust Fund constrains
local management and is unlikely to recover many DENR costs.
Together, these two fees amount to [0.2 + (1.0-0.2)(0.3)] 44
percent of gross receipts, a huge fee for the most profitable venture,
and a totally unlikely fee for local CBFM operations in largely
subsistence-level communities.
In terms of Figure 4, any management restrictions, including
restrictions on use of the Trust Fund, raise local costs to c ' or reduce
X
market opportunities to pf' in a location which we already know to be
financially marginal. Extracting 44 percent of the sale value of forest
products is almost sure to remove all remaining financial incentive,
therefore all incentive for sustainable management and all opportunity
for DENR cost recovery, from many remaining CBFM opportunities.
Figure 4 describes the case of those CBFMs that might still retain
some financial incentive after the removal of these fees. Costs are
higher by the expenses for hiring an AO, completing an inventory and
a management plan, etc. Prices are also lower due to government
constraints on acceptable activities, including constraints on log
shipment. The basic twenty percent fee (pf' - 0.Spf' ) iS removed (the
larger shaded area) and a second fee equal to thirty percent of
remaining receipts (O.Spf' - O.56pf' ) is removed (the smaller shaded
area) to create the Trust Fund. This Trust Fund must cover all previous
DI=NR costs, plus an additional charge for scaling logs and collecting
the log fee. The local holders of the CBFM rights now have an
incentive to illegally log the entire area between E" and E. Obviously,
this is not a desirable outcome for the holders of CBFM rights or for
DENR cost recovery, and it explains our preference to minimize these
fees and to rely on a single basic charge for land use rather than log
fees and a Trust Fund.
In sum, our recommendation is to keep both the CBFM contract
and its oversight as simple as possible, to minimize DENR costs, and
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possible--but to withdraw and protect the most risky environments.
.Where sufficient local interest allows, DENR might auction the land
use rights and collect the auction proceeds to cover its local costs,
but we do not anticipate that the receipts from any particular auction
will be substantial. DENR must always remember that CBFM is
designed for cases where DENR's enforcement ability has always
been limited and where local inhabitants are well-identified with the
resource.
Recommendations for Industrial Forest
Management Agreements
The objectives of IrMA are a) the collection of forest rents--or the
government's constitutional "production share'--and b) environ-
mental protection or sustainable management. There is no equity
objective within IRMA. The lands within an IrMA may include
degraded forests, forest plantations, and productive residual forests
but formal distinctions among these land use classes are unnecessary
because they do not help satisfy these basic IrMA objectives. They
only raise DENR's costs for assessing the differences and create
incentives for private operators to misclassify their lands.
Once more, the basic problem is to identify the IrMA boundaries
and the environmental risks within these boundaries. Once more,
there is no need for the standard forest inventory, but an assessment
of environmental risks will be useful. Public participation can assist in
identifying boundary conflicts and environmental risks. The most
helpful formal public participation activity would focus sharply on
these two issues alone. 11
DENR may choose to withdraw the areas of environmental risk
from the IFMAs--as we recommended for CBFMs--or it may choose
to leave these areas in the IFMAs while establishing standards for
their management and monitoring performance. The environmental
11. ThecurrentIrMA documentsallowthe 28 existingTLAsto transfertheiroldTLAs
to IFMAs. Transferscanbeaccommodatedwith ourrecommendations byallowingthe
possessorof theold TLAtheright offirst refusalat theauction'shighbidprice.
12. ThecurrentIrMA documentsallowthe28 existingTLAsto transfertheirold TLAs
to IFMAs.Transferscanbeaccommodated within ourrecommendations byallowingthe
possessoroftheoldTLAtherightoffirst refusalattheestablished feeor,intheeventof
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bond referred to in the current IFMA documents was designed to
protect against environmental non-compliance. For the bond to
satisfy this objective, it must be set at a level that would recover
DENR's costs of rehabilitating the environment in the event of non-
compliance. Assessing the bond value will require a DENR
assessment of the IFMA site. The bond value will be a function of the
erosion control or reforestation or other activities specific to the
particular IFMA and necessary to restore that environment if the
private operation defaults on its contractual obligations. Therefore,
each IFMA bond would be set at a different level, and DENR would
collect the bond only in the event of default on the contractual
environmental performance with respect to contractually identified
environmental risks.
The government does not receive its "production share" from the
bond. The government's production share comes from payment for
the use rights to land within the IFMA boundaries (and subject to
management constraints for the areas of environmental risk). The
payment need not distinguish between degraded, plantation, or
productive residual forest because private bidders will make their Own
assessments of the values of each, and they will bid more where the
land or standing residual forest are more valuable. Thus, we
recommend both an environmental bond and also a fee for the land
use rights. 12 Their values are unrelated and each is unique to any
particular IFMA. The bond would not be collected except in the event
of environmental non-compliance. The land use fee is the
government's production share (corresponding to RA7161
requirements) and it would always be collected.
DENR may choose to set the land use fee, or it may choose to set
a minimum bid price at which an auction begins and it may choose to
withdraw any offers for which there are an insufficient number of
bidders. In the latter event, DENR must ask itself whether the sparse
number of bids was because the particular IFMA is financially
unattractive at the minimum bid price, or whether redrawing the
boundaries (perhaps dividing the IFMA into multiple smaller IFMAs)
would attract more bids.
In any event, the optimal IFMA size from the perspective of DENR
has to do with balancing maximum recovery of the government's
production share against DENR's continuing cost of environmental
monitoring. The optimal size for private management will change as
time passes and forest values change. DENR will assure itself of theHYDE et al: FORESTCHARGESAND TRUSTS 251
highest-value land uses and the greatest receipts from land use fees if
it permits IFMA transfers, in whole or in part, to any operator willing
and capable of honoring the initial contract, including the bond on
environmental performance.
The large backlog of areas currently eligible for IFMA
consideration might lead DENR to consider the sequence in which it
awards its IFMA contracts. All IFMA contracts cannot be negotiated
immediately because the boundaries and environmental standards for
some have yet to be established. Those potential IFMAs which might
be most responsive to environmental improvement might be bid first.
Those areas where the presence of large private operators might
exercise useful controls on illegal local uses might also be bid early.
Those IFMAs with internal areas of large environmental risk and those
which might provide inadvertent access to areas of adjacent
environmental risk might be delayed. For example, DENR might delay
negotiating an IFMA that is adjacent to an old growth natural forest
preserve and which would provide the only access to that forest. The
delay would extend the period of limited access and greater
protection for the old growth reserve.
Subsequent to awarding the contract, DENR's only responsibility,
albeit a critical responsibility, is to monitor environmental
performance on the risky sites within the IFMA according to the
standards for those sites laid out in the contract. A good private
operation will create a management plan for its own purposes but
DENR approval is necessary only for that part of the plan addressing
the sequencing of environmental improvements like contractual
reforestation require-ments. DENR does not need to impose an annual
allowable cut (AAC) restriction because we know it probably cannot
monitor such restrictions successfully, and because the reason for the
AAC restriction is to protect the environment. Specific environmental
objectives would be accomplished more directly with contractual
obligations and with DENR's own more focused environmental
monitoring. There is no reason for periodic reviews of any IFMA
beyond the regular environmental monitoring and the review DENR
would initiate itself upon evidence of environmental non-compliance.
The result of our package of recommendations should be a
simpler process for granting IFMAs and also a simpler and more
focused process for monitoring their performance. This means lower
DENR costs, lower costs for the private operation, greater investor
incentive, greater confidence in the long-run reliability of the process,252 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMEN_T_
and an improved likelihood of long-term and sustainable forestry
investments. The financial expectations of the private operator will be
greater for all of these reasons, and the government fees will also be
greater. An improved climate for private operations is important.
Many of the 227 IFMAs approved since 1992 have not been
implemented because they could not obtain financing. Meanwhile,
DENR's responsibilities are also simplified to emphasize environmental
protection and this too should improve accomplishment of that basic
objective.
CONCLUSION: A NEW ROLE FOR THE DENR
AND ITS FORESTERS
Our recommendations all point to a reinforced role for DENR
foresters as protectors of the natural environment. DENR's role in the
full range of forest management and especially timber management
activities would decrease, but its revenue recovery would increase
and its role as an environmental monitor and enforcer would expand.
The public would probably respond well to this idea: The private
operators of CBFMs and IFMAs would also respond well so long as
DENR is consistent in its environmental decisions.
Environmental risks are pervasive, but the DENR's resources are
limited. Therefore, DENR should focus its environmental monitoring
and enforcement resources on areas that satisfy the combined criteria
of a) great risk and b) potential DENR impact. Selecting areas that
satisfy one without the other would not be very useful. DENR
managers would do well to remember this rule when removing risky
sites from CBFMs and when selecting environmental standards for
risky areas within the IFMAs.
We have shown that many forests and degraded natural
environments will remain open access areas subject to unsustainable
land uses (region B' to E in our Figure 1), and that DENR would be
unlikely to alter this fact without bringing an inordinate level of
resources to bear on the problem (cr' in Figure 1 is too high). DENR's
best option is to select the most threatened and riskiest environments
within this range of open access, and also the most important
environmental resources in the neighborhoods of current logging and
other forest removal (points D or E in Figure 1). It might choose to
maintain a list of those environmentally Critical locations that may beHYDE et al: FORESTCHARGESAND TRUSTS 253
within its abilities to monitor and enforce. The list would change with
time but the act of thinking about the choices on the list would gain
public good will and alert the worst potential violators.
DENR can shift some of its field personnel away from responsibi-
lities for forest inventories, timber management plans, log scaling,
and log fee collection. These personnel can assist with the agency's
expanded environmental monitoring and enforcement responsibilities,
and they ca'n gain local goodwill or the agency by providing technical
assistance in local communities where agroforestry has potential
(point F in Figure 1).
Finally, central office personnel can participate as well. They can
search for ways to decrease the costs of transferring and
administering the land use rights (cr' in Figure 1) to CBFMs and IFMAs,
and thereby decrease one part (B'-B) of the area of unsustainable
open access. The policy office in DENR can participate by identifying
macroeconomic policies and policies that favor other sectors of the
economy but spillover to affect forestry, or to send migrants to the
uplands and, in either case, destroy forest environments. DENR has
an important stake in the macroeconomic and ex-sector policies that
affect forestry. This stake is not commonly recognized by the
European and North American forest ministries, but it is important for
many developing countries where these policy spillovers can have
critical impacts on the forest environment. The DENR Secretary and
policy makers outside of DENR need to understand these issues better
in order to help us all protect the upland environment.
The satisfaction to be obtained from this renewed environmental
role for DENR's foresters would come from its formative rather than
reactive character. It reclaims the position of foresters as
environmental managers and it serves the Philippine public well.
These are the reasons most foresters entered the profession, and
they are the reasons that many of them chose public service. It is a
role that fits them well.254 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
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